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STATE OF UTAH 
LORIN R. FARNSWORTH, father of 
Matt Robert Farnsworth, deceased, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
O F U T A H , ARCHITECTURAL 
BUILDING SUPPLY, THE STATE 
INSURANCE FUND, and THE SEC-
OND INJURY FUND OF THE 





STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Upon the death of Matt Robert Farnsworth, the 
plaintiff herein, Lorin R. Farnsworth, father of the de-
ceased, filed a claim with the Industrial Commission of 
Utah requesting funds allegedly due him for his partial 
dependency on his son under the Workmen's Compen-
sation Act. 
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DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BY THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
After a hearing on the claim presented by the plain-
tiff, Lorin R. Farnsworth, the Industrial Commission of 
Utah entered an order denying plaintiff the benefits re-
quested for his dependency on the deceased. The Com-
mission found that the plaintiff, under the circumstances 
of this case was not entitled to the benefits. 
Upon the filing of a Motion to Review, the entire 
Commission reviewed the grounds for granting said mo-
tion and itself ordered that the dependency shown by 
the facts of the case was not that which is contemplated 
and intended within the meaning of the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act. With said order, the Motion for Review 
was denied. 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmation of the Hearing Exam-
iner's findings and affirmation of the Industrial Com-
mission's order that the dependency shown was not that 
intended under the Workmen's Compensation Act and 
that said benefits requested by the plaintiff be denied. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent agrees substantially with the facts 
as set forth by the plaintiff but makes the following addi-
tions and corrections: 
1. While the deceased was in high school, he worked 
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for Egbert Parking Service as a part-time employee. He 
often worked split shifts upwards of 12 hours per day 
(R. 28). Though this lengthy shift work was not con-
sistent, he would consistently work at least 20-25 hours 
per week in addition to going to high school (R. 28). 
2. Though Matt Robert Farnsworth was employed 
during high school and after graduation, he continued to 
reside at home, eat meals at home, and share the bene-
fits of the family unit as he was accustomed to (R. 34). 
He retained all income from his jobs and did not con-
tribute any such funds to his parents for room or board, 
etc. (R. 34). 
3. Appellant testified at the hearing that the de-
ceased was reimbursed for gas used in deceased's car 
when said car was used for transporting him (R. 41). 
Further, appellant testified that the main reason he paid 
bills in person was to get outside and to simply go 
somewhere (R, 38). Further, he testified that his boys 
and "my wife" would read mail to him (R. 46). 
4. Appellant's mother died several months before 
the hearing and appellant took care of her house because 
he had not decided what to do with it — whether to sell 
it or rent it (R. 37). All indications in the testimony in-
dicated no need for the extensive care. 
5. Mark Farnsworth testified that he was able to 
accomplish all that the deceased brother had (R. 60). 
Even though unemployed at the time, he testified his 
services were worth $500, the same amount requested 
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by his father in his application (R. 58). Mark further 
testified that part of the time he would spend in helping 
his father would be working on cars (R. 57). The appel-
lant, wife, and son Mark at that time had 6 cars and two 
trucks (R. 60); and that before the death of Matt, he 
had spent approximately one hour a day in behalf of his 
father (R. 57). 
6. The appellant indicated without reservation that 
Matt would do the watering, mowing and odd jobs around 
appellant's mother's home, but that if it needed painting, 
he would pay someone else to do the work. 
7. The deceased was working full time and only 
earning approximately $400 per month (R. 26, 27), where-
as the appellant claims that the services of the son of 
approximately 2% hours per day (R. 39) or 15 or so hours 
a week at most is worth $500, $100 more than he made 
in gainful employment. Also, the record is clear that since 
Matt was working for Architectural Supply, extended 
journeys were taken by the deceased (e.g., the trip to 
Idaho Falls when he was killed) which would show his 
inability to do all he had done before (R. 6). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THERE WAS NO SHOWING OF ABUSE ON 
THE PART OF THE HEARING EXAMINER 
OR THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION IN 
RULING AGAINST THE APPELLANT; AND 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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AS SUCH THE DECISION OF THE COM-
MISSION MUST BE AFFIRMED. 
In Rigby v. Industrial Commission, 75 Utah 454, 286 
P. 628 (1930), cited by the plaintiff in support of his 
position, this court said: 
Whether one person is dependent upon an-
other within the meaning of the Workmen's 
Compensation Act is primarily a question of fact. 
It is the exclusive province of the Industrial 
Commission to determine the facts and to draw 
legitimate inferences therefrom. It is also, in 
the first instance, the province of the Commis-
sion to determine from such facets and infer-
ences whether dependency does or does not ex-
ist. When, however, the established facts and 
inferences reasonably deducible therefrom can 
lead to but one conclusion, a question of law is 
presented which this court, upon property ap-
plication, must review. (Emphasis added.) 
This court further expressed the powers it has in 
such cases in Combined Metals Reduction Co. v. Indus-
trial Commission, 74 Utah 247, 278 P. 1019 (1929). There, 
the court said: 
The power of this court to review an award 
made by the Industrial Commission "shall not 
be extended further than to deterniine whether 
or not: 1. The commission acted without or in 
excess of its powers. 2. If findings of fact are 
made, whether or not such findings of feet sup-
port the award under review. 
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These cases clearly show the state of the law regard-
ing the Commission's findings. The record contains more 
than ample evidence and testimony to establish that the 
hearing examiner's decision and the later holding of the 
Commission was not against the weight of evidence "as 
a matter of law." Further, Rigby holds that only when 
one decision could have been reached (from the evidence) 
and was not, the Supreme Court had grounds to inter-
vene in reversal. Such is not the case at bar, for the 
facts support a legitimate contest based on the Commis-
sion's interpretation of the evidence. 
Not only did the hearing examiner state in his find-
ings of fact and conclusion of law that the evidence was 
clearly against the position of the plaintiff, but the In-
dustrial Cosmission also stated in its denial of Motion for 
Review (R. 96) that: 
. . . the Commission has reviewed the file 
and memorandums contained therein, and we 
are of the opinion that the motion for review 
should be denied. It is our judgment that al-
though the applicant may have been dependent 
upon the deceased for certain activities, the de-
pendency as expressed by the evidence is not 
one that was contemplated within the meaning 
of the Workmen's Compensation Act. (Empha-
sis added.) 
Therefore, it is evidence from the foregoing that the 
evidence interpreted by the Commission and Hearing 
Examiner led to the denial of relief. Since this evidence 
was weighed carefully with the plaintiff herein arguing 
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vigorously for his position, the decision affirmed by the 
Industrial Commission must be affirmed by this court. 
POINT II. 
APPELLANT WAS NOT PARTIALLY DE-
P E N D E N T ON THE DECEASED SON 
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE WORK-
MEN'S COMPENSATION ACT. 
As correctly cited by the Appellant in his brief, there 
is no presumption of dependency in a case such as the 
persent action. Utah Code Annotated 35-1-71 (1953) 
simply states that for dependencies other than that of 
the wife and children on the deceased husband, the facts 
of the case will determine whether dependency exists. 
It must be realized that whether a parent is well or 
handicapped — as is the appellant herein — children 
have certain obligations or duties to perform "for the 
family unit." Naturally, it varies from family to family 
what extent such responsibilities are imposed. Simply 
because the appellant needs help in doing many things 
does not by itself mean that the State Insurance Fund 
proceeds should be paid to him. The purpose of the Work-
men's Compensation Act was not to enrich those who 
didn't need or didn't qualify for help, but to make it 
possible for individuals who were "dependent" on the 
injured worker to provide for certain things in life which 
would enable them to carry on in light of the injuries 
involved. Since statutory language, as well as court de-
cision, dictates that individual case facts be weighed to 
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decide dependency, the facte, as interpreted by the Com-
mission, must prevail unless they are clearly to the con-
trary. 
Appellant cites several cases purporting support for 
his position. A close analysis of them reveals that they 
are diametrically opposed to the situation within which 
appellant finds himself. Daly Mining Company v. In-
dustrial Commission of Utah, 67 Utah 483, 248 P. 125 
(1926), did establish that direct financial support need 
not exist for there to be dependency under the act, as 
appellant recites. In Daly, however, the son's help was 
found necessary to the plaintiff therein, thereby making 
it possible for the father to make the farm involved pro-
ductive and to make payments on the mortgage. The 
court analyzed the situation as follows: 
• . . the evidence is nevertheless clear that 
he helped to support the family, and that the 
applicant, to some extent at least, was depen-
dent upon and relied on the assistance of de-
ceased in developing and paying for the land 
upon which the family lived. The evidence is 
also sudh that the Commission was justified in 
inferring that deceased, had he continued to live, 
would have continued to assist the applicant in 
paying for the land and in developing the same 
so as to make it productive in the future. 
Appellant bases his claim on the fact that he was 
supported or helped by the deceased, thus making him 
dependent on his son. Had the appellant relied on Matt's 
help for payment on the mortgage, purchasing of food 
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and payment of medical bills, etc., then Daly, id., would 
control. Everything contributed by the deceased son, 
however, had no direct relationship to necessary activi-
ties as expressed in Daly. The Appellant even testified 
that the reason he paid his bills in person — having his 
son take him — was to get outside and away from home 
(R. 38). This is purely a personal desire which has no 
apparent basis for "dependency status." The record as 
set forth in the statement of facts of both briefs is full 
of situations where the son was not required to perform 
the functions done, but did so to help his father out. 
Mowing grass, yard work, watering (R. 30) are performed 
by children of most families. Nothing in the record in-
dicates that this is unique to the appellant. Reading mail 
and magazines perhaps increases the aesthetic value of 
the day, but is not all inclusive that a dependency worth 
compensation exists. 
Rigby v. Industrial Commission, supra, set forth 
several criteria upon which cases of dependency must be 
measured. The appellant's claim must be viewed in light 
of this Supreme Court directive: 
To entitle plaintiff to compensation in this 
case, it must affirmatively be made to appear 
that at the time of the injury (1) plaintiff re-
lied upon his son, in whole or in part, for his 
support and maintenance; (2) that had the son 
not been killed plaintiff would in all probability 
have received some assistance from his son; (3) 
that it was reasonably necessary for the son to 
render his father some financial aid in order that 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the father might continue to live in a condition 
suitable and becoming to his station in life. 
Viewed in light of this test, appellant's claim fails 
to meet the requirements of dependency. The first cri-
teria is "support and maintenance." There is no evidence 
in the record that the son supported or maintained the 
parents — the father — in any degree other than acts 
done to enable the father to care for his personal needs 
(doctor appointments) or self chosen assignment (caring 
for his mother's home for several months). The facts 
establish that the son, though working, was given room 
and board (R. 95), that the son was reimbursed for gas 
used in driving the plaintiff around (R. 41), that the 
plaintiff would not imposed on his son unduly for such 
things as painting which he would pay someone else to 
do (R. 47), that the deceased son retained all wages he 
eamed (R. 34). The feet that the family had 6 cars and 
two trucks (R. 60) which needed "looking after" indicates 
that there was no necessity of having the son "work on 
cars," but that it was a family project to have them — 
much like a hobby. It is, therefore, clear that the plain-
tiff fails to meet the first requirement of Rigby. 
As to the second requirement, the testimony given 
could well be interpreted to establish that the deceased 
would have continued helping his father in some degree 
had he not died, although there was a question as to how 
much help that would be. The deceased was engaged 
(R. 34), had discussed the help with his fiancee (R. 34) 
and had come to some agreement with her that some 
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help would be continued. The fact that he had just 
begun a new full-time job with Architectural Building 
Supply and was required to travel to places such as 
Idaho Falls (R. 6) all add to the inference that the help 
would diminish. Nevertheless, the facte could be read 
to fulfill requirement two. 
Regarding the third criteria, the appellant's action 
totally fails to satisfy it. Even though Daly, supra, refers 
to non-financial aid, there must be some showing that 
whatever was offered to the appellant by the son was 
"reasonably necessary" for the father to manage in his 
"station of life." The loss of a family member does not 
change the "station of life," per se. Such tenninology 
refers to the economic, social, and material plateaus. As 
expressed earlier, that which the deceased did for plain-
tiff was not based on such necessities. With benefits of 
nearly $800 per month (R. 25), which were directed solely 
to the appellant, and the fact that appellant's wife worked 
full time (R. 32) indicates that the station in life would 
permit the expenditure of funds for transportation for 
the activties so conducted by the deceased without affect-
ing this "position." The fact that the appellant reim-
bursed for gas (R. 41) and would pay others to do paint-
ing jobs (R. 47) expressly confirm this analysis. 
In Roller Coaster Co. v. Industrial Commission, 112 
Utah 532, 189 P. 2d 709 (1948), cited by appellant, the 
Commission found that the deceased contributed about 
25% of the total family maintenance costs. "That his 
mother and half-sister were in dire need of his assistance 
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is obvious," said the court. More important in the case, 
however, is the holding the court gave regarding this "sta-
tion in life" proposition: 
Ogden City v. Industrial Commission, 57 
Utah 221, 193 P. 857; Utah Fuel Co. v. Indus-
trial Commission, 67 Utah 25, 245 P. 381, 45 
A. L. R. 882; John Scowcroft & Sons Co. v. In-
dustrial Commission, [70 Utah 116], 258 P. 339. 
It is there, in effect, held that compensation 
should be founded upon the probable financial 
loss suffered by the dependents on account of 
the death of the decedent . . . 
Though the plaintiff cites Ogden City, supra, to sup-
port liberal construction for the workman's dependents, 
such liberality, as pointed out above, depends on need and 
financial loss suffered. Neither of these prerequisites 
have been shown or proven by the appellant. 
The respondent, therefore, submits that, based on 
the foregoing analysis, the Commission's finding that the 
dependency in this case was not that which was con-
templated under the acts should be affirmed. 
POINT III. 
BECAUSE OF THE FUNDS AVAILABLE 
TO HIM, THE APPELLANT WAS NOT DE-
P E N D E N T ON THE DECEASED FOR 
MAINTENANCE IN HIS STATION OF LIFE. 
As indicated in Point II, this court has consistently 
referred to "station in life" as a focal point of analysis. 
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Such a position is based on economic, social, and material 
requirements of life. Hancock v. Industrial Commission, 
58 Utah 197, 198 P. 169 (1921), quoted an earlier Dela-
ware case regarding the test of dependency. The court 
quoted as follows: 
It is not sufficient that the contributions of 
the employe were used ajn paying the living ex-
penses of the claimant, but it must be shown 
that the contributions of the employe were relied 
upon by the dependent for his or her means of 
living judging this by the class and position of 
life of the dependent. . . . 
However, the test of dependency, generally 
speaking, is whether the claimant relied upon the 
employe's contributions for his support wholly 
or partially judging this by what would be rea-
sonable living expenses for persons in the same 
class and position. Support as used within the 
meaning of the statute is of a broader import 
than food, clothing and shelter, and may include 
all such means of living as would enable the 
claimant to live in a style and condition and with 
a degree of comfort suitable and becoming to his 
station in life. (Emphasis added.) 
Contrary to what the appellant alleges, this case, as 
well as Rigby, supra, point out that the mere feet that 
the necessities are not contributed to by the deceased is 
not of itself sufficient to deny relief, but that some visible, 
actual support need be given to help the appellant main-
tain his position. 
The only support of appellant's contention is the 
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statements made in appellant's brief that the deceased 
did "acts" which helped the appellant. It is not shown 
that any of these acts helped the appellant "maintain" 
his position in life. As pointed out previously, the ap-
pellant reimbursed the deceased for travel. To pay for 
or require someone else to do the same acts would not 
change the "station" in life or reduce appellant's standard 
of living. There would be no significant change in finances 
or custom — merely the change of a new person doing 
those acts. 
As quoted by the appellant in his brief, Utah Galena 
Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 78 Utah 492, 5 P. 2d 242 
(1931), said: 
It follows that dependency does not depend 
on whether the alleged dependents could support 
themselves without decedent's earnings, or so 
reduce their expenses, so that they would be 
supported independent of his earnings, but on 
whether they were in fact supported in whole or 
in part by such earnings, under circumstances in-
dicating an intent on the part of the deceased to 
furnish such support. (Emphasis added.) 
Thus, from appellant's own argument, it is clear that his 
contention regarding "necessities of life" does not control 
this case. The record contains no fact that even hints 
that the deceased contributed any earnings to the appel-
lant. On the contrary, it is clear from appellant's own 
testimony that they had agreed that the deceased not 
pay anything (R. 34). Therefore, Utah Galenda, id., con-
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trols to affirm the Commission's decision since appellant 
was not "supported in whole or in part by such earnings." 
The record is clear that appellant had more than 
adequate funds to provide for himself, his family, and 
even his mother's home. The cases cited by appellant 
refer to "necessities/' They do not, however, go as far 
as the appellant proposes. The cases raise a presumption 
that if the deceased helps contribute to the "necessities", 
the individual is dependent. The evidence of this case 
shows that any presumption of dependency beyond that 
point is rebutted, thus affirming the holding of the In-
dustrial Commission. 
The appellant was not dependent on the deceased 
for the necessities of life, and he was not dependent on 
the deceased within the meaning of this court's position 
of maintenance in his "station in life." The decision of 
the Hearing Examiner and Commission should therefore, 
be affirmed. 
POINT IV. 
DEPENDENCY STATUS AT TIME OF 
DEATH DICTATES THAT THE APPEL-
LANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO THE RE-
LIEF HE REQUESTED. 
Utah Code Annotated 35-1-71 provides that the ques-
tion of dependency be determined in accordance "with 
tiie facts in each particular case existing at the time of 
the injury resulting in the death of the employee." 
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Appellant argues that it is not germane to this case 
that Mark Famsworth is now performing the functions 
of his deceased brother. It is a fact that the deceased 
was contemplating marriage (R. 34) and that he would 
not be able to carry on with all the activities he had done 
before marriage (R. 34). It is further a fact that at the 
time of death, the deceased's other brother was perform-
ing services for the father (R. 56-7) and would continue 
to be home. 
These facts were in existence at the time of Matt's 
death. To say that these facts should be "excluded" from 
being important to the issue of dependency is to out-
wardly reject the language of the statute upon which 
appellant bases his contention. 
Can it reasonably be conceived that if parties have 
plans for the future and one dies in the meantime that 
those plans are to be disregarded in determining de-
pendency? The respondent contends that the record gives 
ample supportive evidence for the Commission to decide 
that at the time of death the parties involved had con-
templated future contingencies due to the upcoming mar-
riage of the deceased and that such evidence mandated 
the decision given. 
CONCLUSION 
As has been evidenced by the analysis preceding, 
there was no abuse of discretion by either the hearing 
examiner of the Industrial Commission in reaching the 
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decision appealed from. That decision was based on the 
evidence and testimony given. 
The dependency claimed did not fall in the confines 
of the Workmen's Compensation Act, since the deceased 
contributed only aesthetic and family help, did not con-
tribute financially, and the appellant's station in life was 
not changed. The facts at the time of death support this 
position. 
Therefore, the respondent respectfully submits to 
this court that the decision appealed from should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
FRANK V. NELSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Defendant, The 
Second Injury Fund of the 
State of Utah 
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